Three weeks ago, we shared the joy of the Sudanese masses, led by the Forces for the Declaration of Freedom and Change, when they forced the Transitional Military Council, particularly through the massive June 30 protests, to back down from its coup attempt against the mass movement and to re-open the way to free prosperity. This movement, including restarting the Internet, is his main tool of communication, and to return to the path of negotiation and bargaining after trying to impose his will by force of arms.
We pointed out at the time that the Sudanese revolution entered a third round after the first round culminated in the fall of Omar al-Bashir on April 11 and the second round culminating in the retreat of the military on the fifth of July, stressing at the same time that «each round is harder than before» We are confident that the forces of the Declaration of Freedom and Change, especially its main faction, the Sudanese Professionals’ Association, are aware of the dangers they face, have maintained the mass movement, and continue to strengthen it in response to the ongoing battle and anticipation of another to come.
By saying that a round and a more difficult round has begun, it is clear that we are still facing partial victories, namely, bargaining between the past and the future and the forces that represent them mainly, the “Transitional Military Council” on the one hand, and the “Declaration of Freedom and Change Forces” on the other. In fact, the bargaining embodied in the political agreement between the two parties this month reflects the duality of the existing governance on the ground in Sudan, in this transitional period, between a military leadership determined to keep the ministries of defense and interior (ie the armed forces and security forces) under their control. Like the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces in Egypt following the ouster of Hosni Mubarak, a revolutionary leadership mobilizes popular energies in confronting the military and seeks to employ the mass movement (“war of maneuver”) in a “position war”.
The Sudanese Communist Party is leading the line of those who have criticized the political agreement with its concessions and insist on achieving the goals of the revolution in full, as stated in the Declaration of Freedom and Change. Anyone who sees this situation is wrong to divide and weaken the revolutionary movement
Proving the revolutionary leadership its ability to meet the aspirations of the peaceful, social and economic masses becomes a key factor in its ability to exert influence on the armed forces and democratize its ranks.
In this context, the Sudanese Communist Party leads the line of those who criticized the political agreement with its concessions and insist on achieving the goals of the revolution in full, as stated in the Declaration of Freedom and Change. Anyone who sees this situation is wrong to divide and weaken the revolutionary movement.However, other fundamental forces of the “Declaration of Freedom and Change”, particularly in the “Sudanese Professionals ‘Association,” share the communists’ resentment of the conditions the military insists on imposing a price for accepting power-sharing. It is in the interest of the Sudanese revolution and of the forces of the Declaration of Freedom and Change that a part of the movement play a revolutionary, non-compromising role, to stimulate revolutionary radicalization and counterbalance the reactionary and radical role played by the radical Islamic forces, which the military council invokes in its hardening position.
The next leg of the current round will be the legislation of the ‘Transitional Constitutional Document of 2019’, which in its current form combines principles that can be described as very advanced, more advanced than all Arab constitutions, including the new Tunisian constitution, and the consecration of the balance of power and dual power. In terms of legitimizing the participation of the leadership of the armed forces in political power, even worse than Egypt’s current constitution. However, such bargaining is still hampered by the presence of a military leadership that is trying in various ways to circumvent the demands of the movement and distort them in the implementation, as it did recently in the alleged investigation of the massacre committed by the “Rapid Support Forces”, as well as the wing of the most reactionary armed forces persevering in Sabotage the bargaining and push things towards a military resolution, as evidenced by the killing of demonstrators in Abyad on Monday.
One of the adage of the Chinese revolutionary leader, Mao Zedong, is that “political power emanates from the barrel of a gun.” If it is true that this reflects a revolutionary experience that was carried out by force of arms through a prolonged popular war, it nevertheless contains the obvious fact that political power is incomplete without the holding of armed force. The big bet for the Sudanese revolution lies in the ability to ultimately control the armed forces by employing the power of the powerless people to that end.
