Charles Abi Nader
The perception of some observers of the results of the recent Moscow agreement between the Russian and Turkish presidents on Idlib varied between those who considered that they came in the interest of the Syrian state, and those who considered them in the interest of the Turkish president, and those who considered that they carried the interest of the parties, but under the ceiling of the Russian strategy to solve the Syrian crisis, which began with Sochi settled until yesterday’s agreement in Moscow, and at a time when each party considered that it had won more than it lost, otherwise it was objected to, as no one said so. Where can its results be drawn up and in the interest of who is in practical and objective terms?
First, by studying the three main points that resulted from the last summit, which are summarized by: Establishing a safe corridor 6 km north of the international road “M4”, and 6 km south of the road, and stopping all military activities along the seam in the de-escalation zone in Idlib, starting with From midnight on Thursday, in addition to conducting joint Turkish and Russian patrols as of March 15 this year, along the road “M4” between the two regions of Tarnba, west of Saraqib and Ain Al-Hoor, south of Jisr Al-Shughour, it can be concluded that:
The points mentioned cannot be isolated from the provisions of the previous Sochi Agreement in 2018, especially since it was clearly stated that the agreement is considered an additional supplement to Sochi without amendment or cancellation of any clause of the last agreement, and most important of these provisions (belonging to Sochi):
The (Russian and Turkish) sides continue to fight terrorism, create a demilitarized zone free of terrorists, and strengthen the Russian-Turkish-Iranian coordination center, in addition to strengthening joint Russian-Turkish patrols.
Based on these provisions, which follow the Moscow and Sochi agreements, and based on the positions, goals and statements of each of the Syrian or Turkish parties, and based on what each of them achieved after the last confrontation, we can conclude in the interest of those who came to the agreement, according to the following form:
– The Syrian Arab Army won a geographical area estimated at about 2000 square kilometers (distributed between the countryside of Aleppo, Hama and Idlib), which it seized by force and a fierce confrontation, from the fiercest confrontations that it has fought so far, as it took place against the Turkish army – the second army in NATO – with its capabilities Advanced quality, such as drones and strategic bombers, which targeted some of their air targets from inside Turkish territory, and this area is practically lost by the Turks and terrorists.
– The Syrian Arab Army completely liberated the “M5” road (Aleppo – Damascus) with absolute control over it, in addition to ensuring the opening of the “M4” road (Aleppo – Lattakia) within a 12 km-wide safe area under joint Russian-Turkish security and military sponsorship (patrols and observation points) And format).
The agreement did not come from either close or from afar to President Erdogan’s request, which he was reiterating as a permanent prestige during the last confrontation period, which is the withdrawal of the Syrian Arab Army even before the previous Turkish observation points, rather, on the contrary, the agreement established the current line of contact and stopped military activities on him.
– The agreement was also proven with clear Turkish recognition without any reservation, counter-terrorism measures, and where this clause practically excludes military operations against the Al-Nusra Front and its accessories from terrorist factions from the clause of stopping military activities, the Syrian Arab Army and its allies have the full right and possibility to continue their battle against terrorism, which They are practically in the field of editorial follow-up, just as President Al-Assad has always stated.
– From a practical and field point of view as well, and in a study of the southern region of the M4 road (Aleppo – Lattakia) between Termaba west of Saraqib and Ain al-Hoor south of Jisr al-Shughour, it will be, by implication, the main cities and towns on it (Jericho, Mahmal and Jisr Al-Shughour) in addition to an area of 6 km south of it Safe and devoid of terrorists, which will create a main area of the Al-Ghab Plain, semi-safe, as it will be free of terrorists and besieged (between “M4” and between the northern Hama countryside and eastern Lattakia), and its crossings will be completely held by the Syrian Arab Army.
In fact, it is not possible for any follower, after conducting the above-mentioned comparison in an objective and scientific way, but he concludes that the results of the Moscow agreement came in the interest of the Syrian Arab Army and its allies, but at the same time (the agreement) succeeded in developing a decent exit for President Erdogan, keeping him face-to-face, And who had very clearly appeared pale in his last meeting with Caesar in Moscow.
