NOVANEWS
By Jawad Raza Khan
History of warfare is filled with enormous number of illustrations regarding counterinsurgency operations, perceptibly with diverse backgrounds against diverse political, socio-economical and most precariously religious motives. Since 9/11, a lamentable propensity has ascended, to use the terms “terrorist” and “guerrilla” as if they were synonyms. This is a serious muddle that may well lead to policy blunders and thus can cost soldiers’ lives.
What constitutes guerrilla warfare is not ideology, but tactics. Its objective is a protracted war of attrition against superior enemy military forces and especially their logistical system. The principal guerrilla tactic is surprise, made possible by mobility and intelligence. Mao wrote that the strategy of the guerrilla is to pit one man against ten, but the tactics are to pit ten men against one. That is, well-led guerrillas will never engage in battle except when they have clear numerical superiority at the point of contact with enemy forces.
Terrorists adopt same tactics of guerilla warfare but not precisely on the logistical system of superior Army but to terrorize the population for their writ. Most of the times they use religion as their basic motivational force, which for at least sometime provide them a firm base with highly enthused manpower to operate in the killing zones with no fear of death. History witnesses many forms of terrorism taking inspirations from different religions for example; Peter Steinfels characterizes the famous Gunpowder Plot, in which Catholics aggrieved by persecution attempted to overthrow the Protestant establishment of England by blowing up the Parliament, is indeed a notable case of religious terrorism.
In recent years students of Counterinsurgency operations have agreed that “the ballot box is the coffin of insurgency” and that’s what ideally happened in 2008, (the election year of Pakistan). Theoretically, for successful counterinsurgency operation; political; military; and population support is inevitable.
The Swat operation had the ground prepared as per the requirement; the affected area was well within the geographical boundaries of Pakistan; it had political support with unflinching backing of international and domestic media; but to counter was a large pool of religiously double crossed youth of Swat valley.
Pakistani citizens and Army was about to face something for which no solution is written in any text book or a military paper, yet it became a source for developing theories and strategies internationally, in the books of military doctrine against insurgencies.
Swat operation was a classic example of coherent and precise application of military and media in combination for first time in the history of own soil insurgency warfare. Political support with elements like national integration and cohesiveness demonstrated unflinching concepts of bravery and heroism, was appreciated and acknowledged over the lengths and breaths both domestically and globally.
Acute scrutiny of success is as important as analysis of a failure. Most of the time failures are evaluated in depth to achieve victory in events to come, but studying a victory for setting up an efficacious path with stability is correspondingly significant than the former and especially when Pakistan is under tremendous pressure to launch operation in North Waziristan.
Students of defense and strategic studies claims that, “shaping the strategic environment while fighting insurgency consists of; isolating the combat area; committing sufficient forces, and; offering the population of the contested region a peaceful path for the alleviation of grievances”.
Let’s equate Swat operation, with said three basic pillars of counterinsurgency operation.
Isolating the Combat Area: