Although Recep Tayyip Erdogan will hold on to the presidency whatever the outcome of the June 7 elections for Turkey’s General National Assembly, or parliament, a strong showing by the Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) could signal the beginning of a shift away from Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party’s (AKP), including its sectarian and divisive foreign policy since the start of the Arab Spring in 2011.
Semih Idizwrites that “given his blatantly authoritarian tendencies, many Turks are worried about the prospect that Erdogan may have his way if the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which he once headed and whose ‘spiritual leader’ he remains, should win a major victory. Many outside Turkey, particularly in the West, having observedErdogan’s abrasive manner in dealing with international matters, and the overtly Islamist and anti-Western tone he employs, are concerned about the direction Turkey’s foreign policy will take in such an event.”
Cengiz Candar reports that a media ban on election reporting in Turkey may have obscured progress by the HDP heading into the election.
“All of the figures [from recent polls] indicate that the pro-Kurdish HDP succeeded in attracting the Turkish left, religiously conservative Kurds who had voted for the AKP in the 2002, 2007 and 2011 elections, and disaffected liberals who had voted for the AKP or the CHP in the past,” Candar writes.
Candar explains that if the HDP, under the leadership of Selahattin Demirtas, obtains 10% of the vote, the threshold required to seat the candidates in parliament, the trend might signal “at least the beginning of the end of the Erdogan era.”
Idiz traces the shift in Erdogan’s foreign policies since 2011, which has led to Turkey’s increased isolation in both the West and the Middle East:
“Following the Arab Spring, Ankara’s foreign policy calculus has been based increasingly on an Islamist outlook with heavy Sunni leanings. Up until then, Turkey appeared to be forging a visionary foreign policy based not only on deepening its democratic ‘European perspective,’ as a candidate for EU membership, but also on developing ties with the Islamic world that suggested it could be a model for the Arab world by proving that secular democracy and Islam are compatible.”
“Meanwhile, Arab regimes that managed to ride out the Arab Spring were increasingly annoyed with Erdogan for his advocacy of the Muslim Brotherhood, which they see as a threat to their own movements. … The support Saudi Arabia and other Arab regimes gave to the coup in Egypt in 2013 was the first shock to Erdogan, still prime minister at the time. … Turkey became an unwanted interloper in the affairs of Arab countries, which is where it largely stands today despite some recent efforts to reset ties with regional countries, most notably with Saudi Arabia. … During the same period, Ankara’s abandoning of its traditional nonsectarian position in favor of blatantly pro-Sunni policies from Iraq to Yemen also clouded Ankara’s ties with Iran, which remain frosty today. In the meantime, Ankara’s Islamist orientation and the strong anti-Western positions taken by Erdogan had already resulted in Turkey’s alienating its traditional Western partners and allies.”
Idiz adds, “The AKP government has tried to put a positive spin on this state of affairs for the sake of its Islamist grassroots supporters. It claims it is pursuing an ethical foreign policy, even if this has resulted in what it refers to as ‘precious loneliness.’ The connotation is that Turkey is isolated today for the right reasons, because it has been taking moral stances on international issues that do not suit cynically calculating regional and global powers. This may appear to be a good stance for AKP supporters. There is, however, little that is ‘precious’ about this isolation that left Ankara with little say in regional developments, even where these have had serious fallout effects on Turkey. This is clearly seen in the fact that radical groups like the Islamic State (IS) or Jabhat al-Nusra are at Turkey’s doorsteps today, while the massive influx of refugees from Syria continue to pose serious social problems for Turks.”
IS threatens Iraqi Kurdistan from within
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq, often considered a firewall against Islamic radicalization in the Middle East, is increasingly threatened by Islamic State (IS) from within as well as outside the region’s borders.
Last month, Iraqi Kurdish security forces captured a terrorist group linked to IS planning a deadly attack in Erbil.
Denise Nataliexplains that the terrorist cell should be understood as part of a broader trend, not as a one-off or isolated incident.
“The local roots of the plotters — as well as previous ones — indicates IS’ societal reach beyond the front lines of Iraq’s disputed territories. The terrorist group has been able to feed off and radicalize Kurds not only through extreme Salafist ideology but deep grievances tied to economic and political conditions inside the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,” she writes.
“IS has also targeted the Kurdistan Region by recruiting and radicalizing Kurdish youth. According to the KRG Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, at least 500 Iraqi Kurdish youths have thus far joined IS to fight on the battleground in Mosul and Syria. One vehicle of local recruitment is the Kurdish mosques, and through local extremist Salafist clerics. Two of the most influential of these cleric-recruiters are Imam Gailani from Sulaimaniyah and Mullah Shwan, a well-known cleric linked to a mosque in Erbil under the auspices of the KRG’s Ministry of Religious Endowments. Shwan’s defection to IS was particularly shocking because he was considered a moderate religious leader and friend to the KRG Ministry of Religious Endowments.
Natali adds that the radicalization trend in Iraqi Kurdistan is not new, and is “as much politically and economically inspired as it is ideologically motivated. It became salient before and during the Kurdish civil war (1994-98), when disaffected individuals and radicalized Islamists took advantage of the power vacuum to expand their influence. Some joined the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan while others turned to the mosques in Erbil where “night classes” were being conducted and in which extremist cells took root — the precursors to Ansar al-Islam. It is during this period that the term ‘teachers by day, terrorists by night’ became popularized and referred to the average local people, including university professors, who became part of the radicalized groups.”
Soleimani: US “didn’t do a damn thing” to stop IS
Iranian leaders have given even greater priority to the threat to Iran from IS following recent gains by the terrorist group in Iraq and Syria.
Abbas Qaidaari writes this week that Iran has increased both its words and its actions in response to IS advances.
On June 2, Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani, chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, said in Latakia, Syria, “The world will be surprised by what we and the Syrian military leadership are preparing for the coming days.”
That same day Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that Iran “will stand by the Syrian nation to the end of the crisis”; he spoke at a meeting in Tehran with Syrian parliament Speaker Mohammad Jihad al-Laham.
Iran has reportedly sent 15,000 fighters to Syria to assist the Syrian armed forces following recent military gains by IS and other armed groups opposed to the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The militia force will include Iranians, Iraqis and Afghanis, according to reports. Backed by the newly arriving fighters, the Syrian government will likely give priority toretaking contested territoryaround Damascus and Jisr al-Shughur.
As IS has gained momentum in both Syria and Iraq, Soleimani said May 26 that Iran is left to carry the fight to IS because the United States “didn’t do a damn thing” to prevent the IS takeover of Ramadi.
