What Turkish Model?

In an otherwise good piece on the Arab revolts for The Nation, Rashid Khalidi had this to say:

Much has been said in recent weeks about the potential of applying the “Turkish model” to the Arab world. In fact, Turkey and the Arab states came to their understanding of modernity—and with it of constitutions, democracy, and human, civil and political rights—through a shared late Ottoman past. This era, from the 1860s until 1918, shaped the understanding of these concepts for their peoples, although both Turkish and Arab nationalists have fiercely denied any Ottoman impact on their modern nation-states.

Today Turkey does provide a model of how to reconcile a powerful military establishment with democracy, and a secular system with a religious orientation among much of the populace. It also serves as a model of economic success, of a workable cultural synthesis between East and West, and of how to exert influence on the world stage. In all these respects, it is perceived as a more attractive model than what is widely seen in the Arab world as a failed alternative: the thirty-two-year-old Iranian theocratic system.

I cannot speak to whether “the Arab world” perceives Turkish secular neo-liberalism as preferable to the hybrid Iranian Wilayat al-Fiqah. Maybe it does and maybe it doesn’t (I couldn’t find polls about this).

But a couple questions. One, who has been discussing implementing the “Turkish model” in Egypt? TheNew York Times, President Obama, and (shit!) Ali Abunimah. Two, what is the nature of this combination of a “secular system” with a “religious orientation”? Well, we know that in Turkey direct military control has waned, although the executive has become more powerful and the police forces have become emboldened. Socio-religiously, Erdogan’s campaign to push for protecting the right of women to wear the headscarf was strategically deployed to dissipate complaints about bread-and-butter issues of social equity: “doctors protesting the privatization of the social security system; teachers asking for a salary high enough to feed their families; Kurds asking for representation in the legitimate political sphere…Instead, TV and newspapers devoted themselves to the scarf,” even while the state funds Islamic schools. You don’t need to be anti-religious to consider it a problem for the state to be involving itself in religion. The peril is not for the state, but rather for religion, which will do better without the state’s bloody hands meddling in it.

Ece Temelkuran goes on to write, “Who is left out of those who think the AKP is a ‘democratizing force’ in Turkey? … only those who understand Turkish democracy as a sort of ‘Islamist corporatocracy’, a bit like Dubai.” As always, the US could care less about religion – its main allies in the region are Saudi Arabia and Israel. Meanwhile, the empire’s main interests in Turkey, Egypt, and elsewhere are the maintenance of institutions that secure the health of neo-liberal capitalism, preferably alongside mild autocracy to keep the rabble in line, although medieval monarchies are fine too. So three, to what extent is the Turkish model an “economic success,” or, for that matter, a well-orchestrated reconciliation between military control and democracy?

Well, against the notion that Turkey has enjoyed any “economic success,” there has been an ongoing structural adjustment program alongside tremendously high unemployment, averaging over 11 percent since 2006. Wages have declined and the government has crushed labor unrest by arresting trade unionists. In 2009 the economy contracted by almost 5 percent. It is a stretch to call Turkey a “model” for any country, let alone one riddled with poverty like Egypt.

Furthermore, Erdogan’s AKP party has in part allayed popular anger by taking a hard stand on Gaza – a hard stand accompanied by continued arms trade with Israeli companies. One Turkish leftist comments, “the AKP government is simultaneously attempting to cater to the new expansionist needs of the Turkish bourgeoisie and to become a regional power so as to better negotiate with the US.” Its stance on Gaza was one part of that: a bone thrown to its base, and the people of Turkey more broadly, who are understandably furious at the Israeli treatment of the Palestinians. But just as it’s hard to take Arab League President Amr Mousa or Gordon Brown seriously when they cry crocodile tears for Gaza, there’s no reason to take Erdogan too seriously either while his party continues to mistreat Turkey’s Kurdish minority.

Meanwhile, in Egypt, strike action continues, against the wishes of the military junta, which continues to jail activists. As Gilbert Achcar comments, “The ‘orderly transition’ is taking shape, as envisaged by the military with US backing: the course is set for transition to an electoral democracy under the army’s control, as took place in Turkey between 1980 and 1983.” So yes, some are discussing the Turkish model – but pretty glumly, apprehensive that the victory of expelling Mubarak will turn into the ash of Mubarakism without Mubarak.

[Thanks for resources Michael and Evren]

Technorati Tags: Egypt, Gaza, Iran, Israel, neoliberalism, Palestine, Rashid Khalidi, Turkey

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