NOVANEWS
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (L) and US Secretary of State John Kerry speak to the media re-garding the current situation in Syria, at the UN headquarters in Manhattan, New York on Sept. 30.(Photo: Reuters).
This is the conclusion of MK Bhadrakumar in an article published in Conflict Forum, a respected political journal published in the US.
When one has been studying and analyzing the politics of the Middle East for some time, one is rarely surprised even when some seemingly exceptionally deceptive policy by some government comes to light. Of course, analysts of Middle East affairs have long been used to varied conspiracy-laden theories.
But Ambassador Bhadrakumar, a former Indian ambassador to several countries, including Turkey (1998-2001), wrote in Conflict Forum that the US may have until recently pursued a policy of degrading, restraining and containing, but not defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), in both Iraq and Syria, but especially in the latter.
This comes as a bit of a surprise.
Bhadrakumar and Conflict Form reported that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated several weeks ago that Russian officials and analysts argued that US policy was not to “degrade and defeat” ISIL but rather simply to allow it to defeat Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. If this is true, it would mean that the 60-strong “Coalition on the War against ISIL” or, at least, some of its leading members, were or would have been aware of such a policy.
The alleged objective of such a policy was that the US wanted the defeat of the al-Assad regime but not ISIL or other jihadists so that they could be used by the US and other members of the coalition against Russia in the Caucasus and, indeed, probably in the Russian Federation itself.
According to the report in Conflict Forum quoting an article in Tass, Lavrov said something along the following lines: “I would not fail anyone by saying some of our counterparts, members of the coalition, say they sometimes have information about certain locations of IS [another name for ISIL] groups, but the coalition’s commander in the US, naturally, would not agree to deliver a strike.
“Our American counterparts either from the very beginning were establishing the coalition not thoroughly enough or the idea was it should have the goals of those declared. The coalition was formed very spontaneously: within just a few days they declared it was ready, certain countries have joined, and they began some strikes.
“Analysis of the coalition’s aviation causes weird impressions. The suspicious are that besides the declared goal of fighting the IS, there is something else in the coalition’s goal. I do not want to make any conclusions — it is not clear what impressions, information or higher ideas the commanders may have — but signals of the kind are coming.”
Bhadrakumar states that Lavrov is an experienced diplomat and that he “would not have made off-the-cuff remarks of such gravity unless there was some truth in them. Of course, one cannot rule out the possibility that Lavrov had the story planted to give validity to Russia’s subsequent decision to send arms, aircraft, tanks, drones, Special Forces and intelligence operatives to Syria in mid-September. “In plain terms,” argues Bhadrakumar, “Lavrov has signaled to Washington that Moscow knows about the American game plan to foster the IS as its cat’s paw to be eventually inserted into Russia’s underbelly in Central Asia and North Caucasus.”
Bhadrakumar states: “Of course, Russian intelligence must be aware that hundreds of fighters [largely Chechen] have traveled from Russia to join the IS. Given this grim reality, Moscow has decided to draw a red line. It has concluded that the IS poses a significant menace to the Muslim-majority regions of Russia’s northern Caucasus.”
Bhadrakumar speculated (on Sept. 16) that such alleged scenarios and speculation impelled Russian President Vladimir Putin to speak to the UN General Assembly on Sept. 29.
On Sept. 25, Conflict Forum reported Lavrov”s complaints and suspicions regarding his accusation that the US was not, in fact, targeting ISIL sites. Two days earlier, on Sept. 23, just after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Moscow, Erdoğan, seemingly accepting Russia’s more strident stand and its stronger military actions in Syria, stated that Assad might be able to stay in power during a negotiated transitional phase to resolve the war in Syria. But he also said that Assad eventually had to go: “Nobody sees a future with Assad in power in Syria.”
Lavrov, again quoted in Tass, announced: “I think now the Americans are much more perceptive to the arguments we have been offering for the past several years. US Secretary of State John Kerry made known Washington’s willingness to cooperate with Russia on the problems of Syrian settlement.”
Developments that occur after Sept. 29. will help us to see how much truth there is in the above analyses.
It must also be taken into consideration that, according to recently published reports, Syria might also have very large deposits of natural gas off its coastline and in its Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ). If this proves to be true, it could also be another reason behind Russia’s intention not just to maintain al-Assad and/or to make sure that Alawites participate in whatever government eventually emerges in Syria and for Russia to further expand its naval and air base near Tartus. Russia, as the primary natural gas supplier to EU countries, obviously would like to protect its sale of natural gas to Europe and to limit EU countries’ access to other sources.
It is now well known that Israel as well as Greek Cyprus has large deposits of natural gas in their EEZs. In late August, Italy’s Eni SpA energy company also stated it had discovered a “supergiant” natural gas field off the coast of Egypt, describing it as the “largest ever found in the Mediterranean Sea.”
If this also proves to be accurate, this would mean that all of the courtiers of the eastern Mediterranean littoral have substantial natural gas (and oil) deposits in their EEZs with the exception of Turkey.
When one has been studying and analyzing the politics of the Middle East for some time, one is rarely surprised even when some seemingly exceptionally deceptive policy by some government comes to light. Of course, analysts of Middle East affairs have long been used to varied conspiracy-laden theories.
But Ambassador Bhadrakumar, a former Indian ambassador to several countries, including Turkey (1998-2001), wrote in Conflict Forum that the US may have until recently pursued a policy of degrading, restraining and containing, but not defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), in both Iraq and Syria, but especially in the latter.
This comes as a bit of a surprise.
Bhadrakumar and Conflict Form reported that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated several weeks ago that Russian officials and analysts argued that US policy was not to “degrade and defeat” ISIL but rather simply to allow it to defeat Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. If this is true, it would mean that the 60-strong “Coalition on the War against ISIL” or, at least, some of its leading members, were or would have been aware of such a policy.
The alleged objective of such a policy was that the US wanted the defeat of the al-Assad regime but not ISIL or other jihadists so that they could be used by the US and other members of the coalition against Russia in the Caucasus and, indeed, probably in the Russian Federation itself.
According to the report in Conflict Forum quoting an article in Tass, Lavrov said something along the following lines: “I would not fail anyone by saying some of our counterparts, members of the coalition, say they sometimes have information about certain locations of IS [another name for ISIL] groups, but the coalition’s commander in the US, naturally, would not agree to deliver a strike.
“Our American counterparts either from the very beginning were establishing the coalition not thoroughly enough or the idea was it should have the goals of those declared. The coalition was formed very spontaneously: within just a few days they declared it was ready, certain countries have joined, and they began some strikes.
“Analysis of the coalition’s aviation causes weird impressions. The suspicious are that besides the declared goal of fighting the IS, there is something else in the coalition’s goal. I do not want to make any conclusions — it is not clear what impressions, information or higher ideas the commanders may have — but signals of the kind are coming.”
Bhadrakumar states that Lavrov is an experienced diplomat and that he “would not have made off-the-cuff remarks of such gravity unless there was some truth in them. Of course, one cannot rule out the possibility that Lavrov had the story planted to give validity to Russia’s subsequent decision to send arms, aircraft, tanks, drones, Special Forces and intelligence operatives to Syria in mid-September. “In plain terms,” argues Bhadrakumar, “Lavrov has signaled to Washington that Moscow knows about the American game plan to foster the IS as its cat’s paw to be eventually inserted into Russia’s underbelly in Central Asia and North Caucasus.”
Bhadrakumar states: “Of course, Russian intelligence must be aware that hundreds of fighters [largely Chechen] have traveled from Russia to join the IS. Given this grim reality, Moscow has decided to draw a red line. It has concluded that the IS poses a significant menace to the Muslim-majority regions of Russia’s northern Caucasus.”
Bhadrakumar speculated (on Sept. 16) that such alleged scenarios and speculation impelled Russian President Vladimir Putin to speak to the UN General Assembly on Sept. 29.
On Sept. 25, Conflict Forum reported Lavrov”s complaints and suspicions regarding his accusation that the US was not, in fact, targeting ISIL sites. Two days earlier, on Sept. 23, just after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Moscow, Erdoğan, seemingly accepting Russia’s more strident stand and its stronger military actions in Syria, stated that Assad might be able to stay in power during a negotiated transitional phase to resolve the war in Syria. But he also said that Assad eventually had to go: “Nobody sees a future with Assad in power in Syria.”
Lavrov, again quoted in Tass, announced: “I think now the Americans are much more perceptive to the arguments we have been offering for the past several years. US Secretary of State John Kerry made known Washington’s willingness to cooperate with Russia on the problems of Syrian settlement.”
Developments that occur after Sept. 29. will help us to see how much truth there is in the above analyses.
It must also be taken into consideration that, according to recently published reports, Syria might also have very large deposits of natural gas off its coastline and in its Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ). If this proves to be true, it could also be another reason behind Russia’s intention not just to maintain al-Assad and/or to make sure that Alawites participate in whatever government eventually emerges in Syria and for Russia to further expand its naval and air base near Tartus. Russia, as the primary natural gas supplier to EU countries, obviously would like to protect its sale of natural gas to Europe and to limit EU countries’ access to other sources.
It is now well known that Israel as well as Greek Cyprus has large deposits of natural gas in their EEZs. In late August, Italy’s Eni SpA energy company also stated it had discovered a “supergiant” natural gas field off the coast of Egypt, describing it as the “largest ever found in the Mediterranean Sea.”
If this also proves to be accurate, this would mean that all of the courtiers of the eastern Mediterranean littoral have substantial natural gas (and oil) deposits in their EEZs with the exception of Turkey.
