NOVANEWS
Comrade Evren Dincer, Turkish radical, who insists that the following be regarded as “commentary from a lay person,” writes:
First of all, i should say that Erdogan’s interest in Gaza has both long-historical and conjunctural context. Historically, his interest and sensitivity comes from the movement he was part of until his imprisonment and his later transformation (roughly, this corresponds to the period between the quasi-coup of 1997 [28 February] and the constitution of AKP in 2001). Welfare Party of the era was very critical of Israel –at least in theory and only in terms of Palestine– and had a very clear target for the salvation and independence of Palestine. However, Turkey of the time had much bigger problems inside. The conflict was hardly a matter of top interest in the Turkish media and politics.
Palestine was more of a source of empathy rather than a political priority. Also, the military’s strong presence in everyday politics did not leave much room for Palestinian politics. The neo-Ottomanist dreams of today were not even imaginable back then. However, we can still say that Erdogan’s sensitivity historically comes from his Milli Gorus (literally National Viewpoint; but as you might know from Arabic classes milli does not necessarily mean nation; it goes beyond that) background, which has always been sensitive about Palestine but never been radical about it.
Conjunctural context is a little bit more complicated. To understand that, one should think about the context in which Erdogan rose in Turkish politics. Millennium closed with two successive economic crises (1999 and 2001) and even worse, with a psychologically damaging earthquake in 1999. As I remember clearly, the conflict was far from being an issue, let alone a priority. AKP’s rise coincides with this moment of multiple crises.
Traditional centrist parties of the time literally fucked up the country. Inequality soared, the idea of middle class collapsed along with economic welfare. In this period, my father had to leave the country to find a job like thousands, maybe millions of others. (He still lives abroad). AKP offered a very simple thing at the time: development with justice. Their strong base in center right took them to power; thanks to the extremely unjust election law –10 percent national threshold which basically aims to keep Kurds out of the assembly–they did not even need a coalition government.
This happened in 2002 and until 2006, we did not have conflict as part of our national agenda. On the contrary, our relationship with Israel was quite stable. Of course, you might think that this relative silence was due to the post-9/11 environment. But, this had more to do with Turkey’s relative weakness and internal political conundrum. Internal political turmoil has always been more important than Turkey’s foreign policy; by turmoil I mean the debates on secularism and the army. So one should keep in mind that none of Turkey’s foreign policy issues has ever been more important than internal affairs. Major foreign policy issues are the following: Cyprus, Armenian question, Greece, Kurdish question which is equally a matter of internal affairs, finally EU accession.
Until 2006, our top issue was the EU accession process. This was partly due to AKP’s search for external political ally against the army and secular establishment inside. In relation to EU accession, top item in our national agenda was Northern Cyprus. As I recall, 2004 Annan Plan referendum was the only thing we discussed for months in terms of foreign policy. Before that, the biggest sensation was the ballot in the national parliament about permitting US forces to use Turkish land and air space for the invasion of Iraq (March 1, 2003). Despite Erdogan’s huge push, almost one third of his party’s MPs voted against. With the opposition party votes, the proposal lost. As I said, Israel-Palestine conflict was not even on the list. In fact, Israel supported Erdogan in 2003 very much since the main interests of the parties were quite common. Believe me, he enjoyed that support a lot.
As I said, relations with Israel went pretty stable until Meshal visited Turkey early in 2006. I really do not know the prehistory of that visit; but as far as I remember, this was quite unexpected for many. To be honest, it pissed off Israel a lot, but I do not think that they took it too seriously back then. I mean I do not think that Israel was expecting Turkey to be so persistent in terms of Gaza.
Meshal’s visit coincided with the rage against America –which was not due to the invasion of Iraq but the constitution of the independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq– and I guess back then everyone thought that it was a strategic move to strengthen the hand of Turkey in regional politics. I mean, people thought that it was a reaction to Israeli–American coalition using the Hamas card. I still think so. In other words, the conjunctural background for Meshal’s visit had less to do with Gaza than autonomous Kurdish state in north Iraq.
However, many people including me, did not believe Erdogan to be so persistent in this. Turkey is not traditional party of the debate between Israel and Palestine. (Actually this has to do with the position of current secretary of state, Davutoglu, too. But we can talk about it later) Even today, Turkey only uses the humanitarian conditions discourse, which makes sense because as a country Turkey does not have any direct interest. I think, no matter the reason, Turkey’s ambition to be persistent party of the debate and the process is good.
Like many others, I thought sending a flotilla against blockade was a great move. However, I guess Turkey was not expecting Israel’s response to be that harsh. It was quite a shock. Also, Turkey was expecting an apology right after, but did not happen. Now, Turkey does not have any chance to help people in Gaza. Despite all, UN report still clearly argues that the blockade is necessary for security. And more importantly, it is so hard for foreign policy people to explain Turkey’s role in this matrix.
I think Turkey’s current move is just to gain some ground in the debate. The only way to threaten Israel is degrading the status of relationship between the two countries. Secretary of the State said that the military agreements are suspended, but everyone including mainstream media like CNN and NBC knows that this is not true. Everyone knows that the long-standing deals on UAVs will continue.
This is such a slippery ground and believe me, right after Israel’s apology (it does not even have to be a full apology) everything will go back to normal and Turkish mainstream media will stop discussing that for a while. I cannot imagine something else in an environment in which Turkey has very tense relationships with Iran (because of Syria), with Syria (everyone in the region thinks that Turkey is acting like America’s little partner in this issue), with Cyprus (we have a new fight about oil search in East Mediterranean now), with Iraq (for obvious reasons).
Most importantly, none of these had such a little impact on Turkey’s relationship with US, which makes me think that everything is indeed bluffing.
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