Jihadis now integral part in US designs for Syria

 
Yesterday, our esteemed FB Ali commented on the US plans for Syria:

„In Syria [the US] plan was to use the non-IS jihadis against IS by promising them a part in the post-Assad Syrian regime. That is the reason why Kerry is promoting a political transition there to get Assad out, hand over Syria to these jihadis with a bunch of old Syrian politicians being the external face of the regime (mainly for pacifying public opinion back home). Saudi Arabia and Qatar have provided the necessary assurances that the US will have nothing to fear from this new Syrian government, and that it will follow the plan.
The US will provide more arms to this ‘new Syrian army’ (ie, the non-IS jihadis) and hope that, with the Kurds and Western air support, it’ll knock IS out (or at least push it out of Syria).
This plan has been stymied by the Russian intervention, and the rejuvenated Syrian army’s successful offensive against the jihadis. Kerry is still pushing the political plan, but Russia will never agree to anything that hands Syria over to these jihadis. The outcome is, therefore, likely to be decided on the battlefield, where it currently seems the R+6 will succeed.
For Iraq the West’s plan appears to be to split it into three portions: a Kurdish entity, a Sunni one, and a Shia rump. The first part of the plan has been put into effect. The Kurdish peshmerga, supported by US airpower and SF, captured Sinjar. Additional SF have now been sent to support the Kurdish peshmerga. The Turks have moved troops near Mosul to support the coming Kurdish attack on the city. This expanded Kurdish region will be one entity in the new Iraq.(The Kurds would never attack Mosul or any other non-Kurdish areas unless they had solid assurances that they could keep their gains).
It was because of this plan that the US’s air campaign in Iraq was so devoid of results (often because planes weren’t cleared to attack targets). Large-scale air attacks with their attendant civilian casualties would have alienated the local Sunni population of Anbar. That is also the reason why IS’s oil operations weren’t attacked until Putin shamed Obama into it; even then special steps were taken to avoid Sunni casualties. The hope was (is) to revive the old Sahwa (Sons of Iraq) movement (a Sunni force friendly towards the US) and let it take over Anbar and other Sunni areas of Iraq to form the Sunni entity.“

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FB Ali’s very helpful analysis is an excellent basis for futher inquiry. For instance it sheds light on the reasoning behind the accusation that Assad is allied with IS. Lies and omissions have putpose – misdirection.

♦ Conflating Assad with IS

Just like Assad is regularly accused of colluding with IS by only going after “moderate rebels”, Russia is now regularly accused of not really fighting IS, but bombing “moderate Rebels” instead. Assad is also accused of “buying oil from IS” (formerly his own oil, seized by ISIS, and sold back to him at an inflated price, due to the embargo for lack of a choice – elsewhere one does call that sort of deal notcollusion but extortion). Trifles, I know.

The accusation of complicity conflates IS (Assad’s deadly enemy, which have routinely massacred his troops, given the opportunity) – the only Jihadis everybody can agree on opposing – with Assad – the secuarist everybody already agrees on opposing anyway – and marks them as one target, lest the disgust over IS leads to undesired sympathy for Assad and lest enthusiasm for regime change falters. The objective is to nip in the bud the the insight that one would have to choose between Assad or IS, or that Assad is a lesser evil.
Indications of that insight emerging were already visible in Hollande’s rather reasonable second thoughts after IS’ Paris massacre. These localised outbreaks of common sense forced Kerry into hurried emergency diplomacy, specifically aimed on excluding Iran and Russia from the anti-Syria coalition sometimes also fighting IS, and to prevent France from breaking out of the Washington straightjac ket consensus on Syria. For the US and their nominal regional allies preventing that from happening was imperative.

♦ Breaking the “Shia Crescend”

Key to understanding how Syria has become what it is today is that the Obama administration early on decided to “not do stupid shit“, like occupying countries such as Iraq. By itself, laudably prudent. Alas, one must not make the mistake of assuming, based on that, a lack for appetite for destructionintervention. Interventions would of course take place, the sly and smart ‘soft power’ way (neatly branded and twittered), and if force was needed, it would come through deputised local proxies, balanced from offshore ‘led from behind‘  – in the case of Syria, through Turkey, the Gulfies, and to a lesser extent, Israel.
Taking on Syria was probably concocted in DC as an “assurance” to the Israelis and the Gulfie monarchs to help them over their hysteria over the Iran deal. Normalisation with Iran perhaps, but only if it is ‘defanged’ and it’s greater influence (handed to Iran by the destruction of Iraq by the hapless hands of the Bushmen) curtailed.
Israelis, Gulfies or Turks have made demands for US guarantees, quietly firmly in pursuit of their own goals: Turkish neo-ottoman irredentism or Erdogan’s brand of Islamic pan-Turkism. With the Saudis and the Gulfies Wahhabi chauvinism and the goal of Sunni hegemony to the Mediterranean. With the Israelis it’s about the Golan, and of course, about getting back at their nemesis Hezbollah. It’s hard to not notice the impatience and independence shown by the Turks (especially in their attempts to  draw the US into Syria) and the Saudis (their unannounced aggression against Yemen). These also indications that ‘leading from behind’ didn’t suffice to reassure these “special needs” proxies. It also calls into question the ability of the US to effectively exercise leadership over these trigger happy “allies”.
It also suggests that there are, as of yet unrealised, plans for a finish in Lebanon and against Hezbollah (pitting, presumably, the victors of Syria – and/or Israel – against Lebanon’s majority group represented by Hezbollah, the Shia).