NOVANEWS
The rapprochement has cemented a coordinated block of Arab countries under Saudi leadership that is likely to dictate Hamas policy, isolate Turkey and assist the battle against ISIS.
By Zvi Bar’el | Dec. 22, 2014
Just two weeks after the Persian Gulf states reconciled with Qatar, it became Egypt’s turn to declare that it had made up with Doha. Statements released on Saturday by Doha and Cairo after a meeting between Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sissi and an envoy of Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, made it clear that the two states intend to turn over a new leaf in their relations. A representative of Saudi Arabia also attended the meeting.
In its statement, Qatar said it would seek to maintain Egypt’s status as the leader of the Arab and the Islamic world and added that “the security of Egypt is the security of Qatar.” The statement was designed to put an end to a long period of diplomatic and verbal confrontation that began with the ouster and arrest of Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi in July 2013.
The rapprochement was meticulously stitched together by Saudi Arabia, which in March launched a diplomatic campaign against Qatar, persuading Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates to recall their ambassadors from Doha. Egypt recalled its own ambassador soon after, and government media outlets in Egypt were instructed to launch a campaign of criticism against Qatar.
The stated reason for the conflict was the Gulf states’ claims of Qatari intervention in their internal affairs and in those of Egypt. But the main catalysts were in fact Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which Cairo declared as a terror organization — Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had already done so — and for Islamist militias fighting in Syria that were not cooperating with the Saudis, as well as Qatar’s close ties with Iran, a staunch adversary of Saudi Arabia.
The soured relations between Qatar and Egypt were covered intensively by Al Jazeera, which is owned by Qatar’s royal family and which positioned itself as a spokesman in the Muslim Brotherhood’s fight against the Egyptian authorities. Qatar, which deposited billions of dollars in Egyptian banks during Morsi’s brief presidency in order to help Egyptians secure loans from international financial institutions, later demanded the return of $6 billion.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates gave Egypt grants and loans to help with the repayments, rendering Cairo almost completely dependent financially on those two countries. This dependence was also quickly translated into diplomatic “coordination” of the kind that requires Egypt to toe the Saudi diplomatic line, both with respect to Arab affairs and wider international considerations. In the process, the Saudis built a solid Arab bloc, the unity of which was challenged only by Qatar.
Now that the reconciliation process with Qatar is complete, Saudi Arabia is free to dictate its policies vis-a-vis the Muslim Brotherhood, Syrian rebel groups and Iran and its regional proxies, such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah.
Egypt, which should be the primary benefactor from the rapprochement, can now expect Qatar to end its assistance to the Muslim Brotherhood, at least officially. And the Doha-based Al-Jazeera, the most-watched television network in the Middle East, could be expected to end the kind of coverage that has been a daily thorn in Sissi’s side.
Qatar may also renew its economic assistance to Egypt and join Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in investing in construction and infrastructure.
At the same time, Hamas may be in for new difficulties, as Qatar is expected to coordinate any project or assistance for the Gaza Strip with Cairo. That will increase Sissi’s control over the pace of reconstruction and development in Gaza.
This renewed dependence could have implications for Palestinian rule in Gaza inasmuch as without Qatar’s assistance, or with conditional assistance that depends on Egypt’s consent, Hamas’ independent rule in Gaza will erode that much further. In this way, the Saudis, via Egypt, will be able in large measure to dictate Palestinian decision making.
The detente between Qatar and Egypt is likely to influence Turkey’s status and foreign policy as well. Turkey is now left isolated in its anti-Egyptian stance, particularly in light of Iran’s efforts to renew relations with Egypt and Sissi’s rise to power.
Until now, Qatar and Turkey teamed up to ostracize Egypt, and from now on Turkey will have to rethink its steps. Iran, which has close trade and cooperation ties with Qatar, is not expected to be influenced by the reconciliation, even though it means strengthening the Arab position against Iran regarding the prospects of signing a nuclear deal that would significantly change its strategic position vis-à-vis the West, and particularly relative to the United States.
It seems therefore that the reconciliation has cemented the political hierarchy in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia positioned at the head, surrounded by a block of coordinated, not to mention subservient, countries that will serve as an unofficial substitute to the Arab League. Such a coalition is likely to better serve the struggle against rebel forces, and especially in the war against the Islamic State group, also known as ISIS or ISIL.
